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INTRODUCTION
Paul

Lichtefeld

("Lichtefeld"),

by

and

through his

counsel of record, Morgan, Scalley & Reading, submits this reply
brief concerning issues which have been raised by his filing of
this appeal.

Lichtefeld directs his reply brief specifically to

arguments concerning the Utah Constitution's open court provision
and equal protection of the laws.

Lichtefeld submits that the

other issues raised in his appeal have been adequately briefed to
the court and that following oral argument, the court will be in
a position to render a decision thereon.

However, Lichtefeld

suggests that any one of the issues raised, as outlined below,
establishes

sufficient

grounds

for reversal

of the

District

Court's decision.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the Utah Architects' and Builders' Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
U.S.

Const.

amend.

XIV,

§

1 by

depriving

plaintiff

equal

protection of laws?
2.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate
the Utah Const, art. I, § 2 and art. I, § 24 by depriving
plaintiff equal protection of laws?

1

3.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 by depriving plaintiff access to courts
and redress of injuries?
4.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5
the

Utah

Const.

Art.

VI,

§

26

(1953 as amended), violate

forbidding

special

laws

or

legislation?
5.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 requiring that only one subject be
clearly expressed in the Statutory Title?

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OPEN COURT PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AND THIS COURT'S RULING IN BERRY
V. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP.. MANDATE A FINDING
THAT THE ARCHITECTS' AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF
REPOSE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Both the appellant and respondents clearly agree that
this court's opinion in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Inc. 717
P.2d

670

(Utah

constitutionality
art.

1,

§

11,

1985),

established

the

criteria

for

judging

of statutes of repose under the Utah Const.
commonly

referred
2

to

as

the

"open

court

provision".

(See Appellant's brief at pages 25, 31 and 32;

Respondent's brief at pages 21 and 23).

The great divergence in

the positions of the parties relates to whether the holding of
Berry is determinative of the open court issue raised in this
appeal.

The respondents' arguments appear to be three fold, as

they relate to why the Berry decision is not determinative of the
open court issue presented here.
First, the respondents suggested "that there are great
dissimilarities between the two acts . . . "
at page 3).

(Respondent's brief

Presumably, the Smith and Cutshaw argue that the

statutes of repose themselves, including the architects' and
contractors' statute contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 and
that contained in the now unconstitutional Product Liability Act
at Utah Code Annotated § 78-15 et seq. are dissimilar.

It is

interesting to note that no where, other than in the introductory
phrase alluded to above, do Cutshaw and Smith elaborate on the
alleged dissimilarities between the two acts.
Smith

and

Cutshaw's

second

attack

suggests

that

Lichtefeld retains an alternative remedy against the original
owner

of

the

structure,

distinguishable

from

making
the

the

facts

(Respondents' brief at page 23).

3

facts

of

presented

this
in

matter

Berry.

Lastly, respondents Smith and Cutshaw argue that the
architects' and contractors' statute of repose contained at Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 obviates a clear economic evil, justifying
the

arbitrary

establishment

of

a

class

of

defendants

with

complete immunity from actions which accrue after seven years,
(Respondents' brief at page 24).
Lichtefeld contends that the holding in the Berry case
mandates that the architects7 and contractors' statute of repose
is not distinguishable from the statute of repose created in the
products

liability

act

and

accordingly

it

must

be

deemed

unconstitutional as violative of the open courts constitutional
provision.

Considering the decision in Good v. Christensen. 527

P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), the court in Berry indicated:
in sustaining the statute [the
architects' and contractors' statute of
repose] the court declined to make any
analysis of the constitutional claims raised.
It simply made the conclusionary statement
that the attack on the "constitutionality of
the statute . . . [was] without merit."
(citation omitted). Whether the court in fact
addressed the merits of Article 1, section 11
is speculative, and the ruling, therefore,
has little persuasive effect here. Berry at
683.
The Good v. Christensen decision is the only Utah authority upon
which respondent Smith and Cutshaw can rely in asserting that the
architects' and contractors' statute of repose is constitutional.
Lichtefeld's reading of the comment by the court in Berry, quoted

above,

suggests

that

the

court

may

reconsider

its

earlier

position announced in Good v. Christensen, if the Article 1,
section 11, Open Court Provision were raised in a constitutional
challenge.
The constitutional challenge anticipated in Berry of
the architects' and contractors' statute of repose is presented
in this case, as well as a case currently pending decision,
Horton

v.

Goldminers

Daughter v.

Cal

Gas Corp. v.

Concrete Co., Utah Supreme Court, docket No. 870031.

Buehner

Counsel for

Lichtefeld has reviewed the briefs filed in Horton, and finds the
arguments

submitted

by

the

appellants

in

said

case

highly

persuasive, particularly as they relate to the inter-relation
between the Berry decision and an attack of unconstitutionality
based on open access to courts under the Utah Constitution.
After

having

heard

oral

argument

in

the

Horton

matter

in

September, the court is fully apprised of the arguments which
support a finding that the architects7 and contractors7 statute
of repose is unconstitutional and accordingly those arguments
need not be raised here at length.

For the court's convenience,

applicable argument raised by the Horton Appellants in their
reply brief is attached hereto labeled Addendum 1.

However,

there is one important distinction between the Horton case,

5

currently pending decision before the court, and the facts of the
matter presented here.
One can envision three classes of plaintiffs who could
be directly affected by the architects7 and builders' statute of
repose.

One class would include third-parties who were injured

while on the premises of the owner or occupier of the improved
real

estate.

Another

class

of

plaintiffs

would

include

subsequent owners or occupiers of the improvement to real estate.
A third class of plaintiffs would likely include original owners
of improved real estate who have owned the property since its
improvement.

The Horton case presents a case with a plaintiff

who falls in the first class.

This action, on the other hand,

presents a case with a plaintiff in the second class of potential
plaintiffs.

Counsel for Lichtefeld is unaware of any case with a

plaintiff in the third class, which is most problematical as
members of this third class have no remedy against themselves.
See Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5 (Second paragraph).
A.

The Products Liability statute of repose and the
architects7 and contractor's statute of repose are
similar.

In spite of the failure by the respondents to identify
any of the "great dissimilarities" between the statute of repose
established in the products liability act and that established in
the architects7 and contractors7 statute of repose, Lichtefeld
6

suggests that there is no practicle difference between the acts
themselves.

The court in Berry when defining the practicle

effect of the statute of repose in the products liability act
indicated:
In the instant case, the legislature has
imposed less than a total abrogation of all
remedies for injuries caused by defective
products since actions are only barred after
a specified period of time has elapsed.
Berry

at

680.

Certainly, the architects' and contractors'

statute of repose is very similar in that the legislature has
eliminated all remedies for injuries caused by negligence of
architects' or contractors' or others as against the protected
class.
The statutes are also similar in that they contain
exceptions to their overall abrogation of substantive rights
after

passage

of

a

certain

amount

of

time.

The products

liability statute of repose lists what specific causes of action
are barred.

See Utah Code Annotated § 78-15-3 (1) (a-e) .

It is

interesting to note that a claim for an unreasonably dangerous
condition on property is not included in the list of actions that
are foreclosed after passage of six years.
legislature did

In other words, the

leave injured parties with certain remedies,

assuming they chose to file actions on theories other than those
enumerated

in the statute.

apropos.

Assume

that

a

A hypothetical it appears to be
product
7

was

manufactured

with

an

unobvious defect.

Assume likewise that the product is installed

on real property

(i.e. playground

equipment)

and that after

passage of six years, someone is injured as a direct result of
the manufacturing defect.

It is clear that under Utah Code

Annotated § 78-15-3 that an action could be had against the owner
of the property wherein the playground equipment was installed.
The architects' and contractors' statute of repose is
similar in that there is an exception allowing for legal action
against original owners or subsequent owners and occupiers of the
land.

The greatest disparity between the two statutes of

repose appears to be that the statute of repose in the products
liability act contains a six or ten year limitation, while the
statute of repose relating to the architects and contractors
contains a seven year limitation.
B*

Lichtefeld has no effective actionable remedy.

The Berry court concluded, and the respondents agree,
that

the open

court

provision

of the Utah

Constitution is

satisfied
" i f t h e law provides an injured person an
e f f e c t i v e and reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e remedy
*by due course of law' for v i n d i c a t i o n of h i s
constitutional
interest.
The
benefit
provided
by t h e
substitute
must
be
substantially
equal
in v a l u e or
other
b e n e f i t t o t h e remedy abrogated in providing
essentially
comparative
substantive
p r o t e c t i o n t o o n e ' s person, p r o p e r t y ,
or
8

reputation although the form of substantive
remedy may be different." Berry at 680.
Lichtefeld

concedes that if the architects' and contractors'

statute of repose provided an effective alternative remedy, that
it would survive constitutional scrutiny under the access to
court theory.

However, as demonstrated below, there is no

effective alternative remedy provided

in the architects' and

contractors' statute of repose.
The respondents have boldly asserted at page 2 3 of
their brief that:
Lichtefeld in this case has potential causes
of action against the prior owner of the
structure and materialmen who are not
exempted from the operation of § 78-12-25.5.
Careful analysis reveals that no such causes of action exist.
Claims against the prior owner would necessarily be for
breach of contract or misrepresentation.

The only relationship

between the prior owner and the owner of the structure at the
time damage results is the contractual
parties.

relation between the

Considering that the longest statute of limitation for

an action based on a contract

is six years

(see Utah Code

Annotated § 78-12-23) the statute could have easily run before
the expiration of the seven year statute of repose.

The statute

of limitations for misrepresentation is substantially shorter,
though it is tolled until discovery of the misrepresentation.
9

See Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-26(3).

A claim based on either

breach of contract or misrepresentation would be premised on the
prior owner having knowledge of the defect.

However, in cases

such as that now before the court, the defect is latent; no one
has knowledge of the defect and negligence which caused it until
the damage occurs.
the

defect

and

In this case, Lichtefeld's first notice of
negligence

causing

statutory period of repose had lapsed.

it

occurred

after

the

The latent nature of the

defect precludes any action against the prior owner.
No alternative successful claim could be made against
materialmen.

Proximate cause analysis, as suggested

in the

report of the forensic engineer contained as Addendum I of the
appellant's brief, suggests that it was the negligence of the
contractor and the architect which resulted in the actual damage.
The building was constructed such that the specified materials
failed.

(See Addendum I, appellant's brief).

The architect

apparently failed to notice the substantial deviance from the
specifications during his inspections of the cabin.

It is true

that the materials themselves failed and that that failure was
the cause in fact of any damages.

However, clearly the legal

cause of the damages was the misuse of the materials by the
contractor and his inappropriate installation of the same.

10

Lichtefeld and others similarly situated have no other
remedy available
lapsed.

once the seven year statute of repose has

If their damages are proximately caused by negligence of

an architect or contractor a claim that they have an alternative
remedy against the materialmen

is unsupported.

Without the

required alternative remedy as discussed in Berry, the court
should

reject

the

respondents'

argument

that

there

is

an

alternative remedy and the court must conclude that the statute
is unconstitutional on that basis.
c

»

No rational basis exists between the alleged
economic evil and the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated § 78-12-25.5.

The respondents' last theory for having the architects'
and contractors' statute of repose pass constitutional muster
relating to open access to courts, is that, in the words of the
Berry court:
. . . abrogation of the remedy or cause of
action may be justified only if there is a
clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the
objective. Berry at 680.
Two questions are actually presented
question claimed by the respondents.

rather than the single

The question is not simply

whether there is a substantial social or economic evil.

The

inquiry goes on to make a determination and balance between the
11

elimination of an existing legal remedy being a reasonable means
for achieving the objective.
The Respondents7
respects.

argument here

is defective

in two

First, they fail to identify what the clear social or

economical evil is that must be eliminated.

At page 18 of the

respondents brief, they allege "difficulties of proof frequently
arising from passage of time."
respondents

brief,

they

allege

At pages 19 and 2 0 of the
"a

measure

of

security

for

professionals where liability otherwise might extend into the
retirement of the individuals and imperpituity for corporations."
Footnote 3 at page 19 of the Respondents' brief presents the
hypothetical involving Henry Hobson and his commission to be the
architect and builder for a church completed in 1887 and a slip
and fall accident occurring on the steps of the church in 1981.
An essential flaw in the hypothetical is that the uneven risers
giving rise to the fall of the plaintiff in the hypothetical were
not a latent defect.

Such a defect appears to be the type that

an owner occupier of land should be aware of upon reasonable
inspection.

The type of latent defect such as that in the

Lichtefeld cabin, which was covered by installation, roofing and
interior finishes, simply does not fall in the same category and
accordingly the hypothetical should be disregarded by the court.
Lastly, the respondents appear to believe that encouragement of
12

construction justifies the adoption of this type of a statute of
repose for contractors and architects.

However, as pointed out

by the Alaska court in Turner Construction Co. v. Scales, 752
P. 2d 467

(Alaska 1988) the opposite effect is achieved by a

statute of repose.
In our view there is no substantial
relationship between excepting design
professionals from liability, shifting
liability
for defective design and
construction to owners and material
suppliers, and the goal of encouraging
construction.
The shift of liability to
unprotected parties decreases their incentive
to build in corresponding measure to the
increase incentives of protective parties.
If anything, the disincentive on the part of
owners may be greater than their potential
measure of liability shift, because they may
be liable for a product over which they have
no control. Moreover, design defects may be
catastrophic and experimental design shifts
correspondingly greater unknown risks to
owners, giving them even more reason to not
finance construction. Turner at page 472.
In spite of the attempts by the Respondents to identify
the economic

evils, they fail to specifically

authoritative

legislative

intent as established

point to any
by the Utah

Legislature upon passage of Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5.
Lichtefeld submits that the only apparent economic evil is that
which may be suffered by design professionals and builders as a
result of their being required to defend actions brought after
the repose period.

If such an economic
13

evil

justifies

the

type of legislation enacted in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5
then it necessarily follows that similar legislation could be
passed

to

protect

other professionals

in other professions.

Certainly accountants should be entitled to the same type of
protection as well as attorneys.

However, the supposed economic

evil fails to consider that the actions of design professionals
and builders can have catastrophic effects long after a statute
of repose has run.

Certainly, similar legislation could not pass

constitutional muster if it related to attorneys.
bench

and

legislators

alike

all

recognize

that

The bar, the
actions

of

attorneys can have substantial effects long after advise is
rendered or documents are prepared.

Lichtefeld submits that the

same should be true with design professionals and builders.

The

passage of seven years does not eliminate latent defects that may
be the direct responsibility of design professionals or builders.
The
argument

in

second
this

major problem

regard

is

that

area

of

they

are

the Respondents'
never

able

to

demonstrate why the classification of design professionals and
builders is not an arbitrary classification.

It clearly is.

Suppliers of materials to the same building can be responsible
for damages which occur after the statute of repose runs, while
those who made the decision to use the specific materials and
those who installed the materials have no liability after the
14

statutory

period

classification

of repose,
is

clearly

Lichtefeld
arbitrary

argues that such a

and

accordingly,

the

classification fails to pass the standards announced by this
court in Berry.
The court in Berry considered at length the competing
interest

between

the

access

to

court

provisions

of

state

constitutions and decisions by state courts which have found
statutes of repose to be constitutional.

At pages 677 and 678 of

the opinion reported in the Pacific Reporter Second, Volume 717,
the court enumerated decisions from other jurisdictions which
the Utah court found persuasive.

Specifically, in the cases

cited by the court as authority for its decision to rule the
products

liability

statute of repose unconstitutional

on an

access to court basis, the court relied on nine decisions from
eight other jurisdictions which held architects' and builders7
statutes of repose unconstitutional.

Footnote 8 of the Berry

decision points out that the number of jurisdictions which have
held statutes of repose unconstitutional now nearly equals those
jurisdictions

who

have

consistently

held

repose

statutes

constitutional.
One

must

analysis

of

the

majority

position,

seriously

respondents
and

question
wherein

therefore
15

the

they

correct

"bean

counting"

conclude

that the

position,

is

that

statutes

of

repose

should

be held

constitutional.

Indeed,

detailed analysis of addendums 1 and 2 to the respondents7 brief
reveals several errors.

Specifically, Florida is listed both as

having ruled that a statute of repose is constitutional as well
as having ruled that the statute of repose is unconstitutional.
It

is

interesting

to

note

that

the

decision

cited

by the

respondents suggesting that Florida holds its statute of repose
constitutional was an appellate court decision and not an opinion
of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.

Florida's Supreme

Court's decision in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369
S.2d 572 (Florida 1979) (cited with approval by the Utah Supreme
Court

in Berry v.

Beech Aircraft, Inc.) appears to be the

definitive position of the Florida court as with respect to its
architects' and contractors' statute of repose.
The respondents also list Wisconsin as a state which
has ruled that its architects' and engineers' statue of repose is
constitutional.

Lichtefeld refers the court to the Wisconsin

decision of Callas Milwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wise. 2d
382,

225

N.W.

contractors'

2d

statute

454
of

(1975)
repose

wherein
was

the

architect

specifically

and

declared

unconstitutional on an equal protection basis.
To the list of states which have found an architects'
and contractors' statute of repose unconstitutional, the state of
16

South Dakota must be added.

The case of Daugaard v. Baltic

Cooperative Building Supply Assoc., 349 N.W. 2d 419 (So. Dakota,
1984), held the architects' and contractors' statute of repose in
South Dakota unconstitutional as violative of South Dakota's open
court provision in its constitution.
Considering this court's review of decisions concluding
that statutes of repose are unconstitutional is in the Berry case
and

the

numerous

respondents,

errors

Lichtefeld

in

the

Addendums

reported

suggests that certainly

there

by

the

is no

"clear weight of authority" which is contra to the positions
asserted by Lichtefeld.
POINT II
THE ARCHITECTS' AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF
REPOSE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS,
AS MANDATED BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS
Equal production analysis, whether based on state or
federal grounds, follows the same analytical

process as the

second step in determining whether a statute violates the open
court provision as discussed above.

Basically, the court must

consider whether the legislative purpose behind creating the
architects' and contractors' statute of repose has a rational
basis to effectuate the stated legislative purposes in creating
such classifications.
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The Utah court has considered the question of equal
protection constitutionality of a statute of repose established
in the Medical Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-4 in
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 435 P. 2d 30
1981)•

(Utah

There the court indicated:
The narrow question presented is whether the
legislature may constitutionally single out
the health care profession and provide that
limitation period be shorter for claims of
medical malpractice than for other types of
personal injury claims.
The test to be applied in making such a
determination is whether there exists a
rational basis to treat health care providers
differently from other alleged tortfeasors.

Allen at page 31.
In the Allen case, the court concluded that the statute
of

repose

created

in the Medical Malpractice Act was

violative of equal protection of the laws.

not

The court was able to

make such a ruling based on the fact that the Medical Malpractice
Act identifies in detail the exact legislative purposes for which
the act was established.

Those purposes included considerations

of the high cost of medical malpractice insurance for doctors and
the possibility that many doctors would leave practice due to the
unavailability or the excessively high cost of insurance.

In

response to the legislative purpose, the legislature shortened
the normal statute of limitations for bringing a negligence act
18

against doctors and provided a four year statute of repose.

See

Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-4(1).
Unfortunately, the court

in Allen v.

Intermountain

Health Care, was not presented with a claim that had never been
actionable based on the four year statute of repose.

Rather, the

court was faced with a simple factual situation where a plaintiff
had failed to file her action in spite of the fact she had
knowledge of the malpractice and accordingly allowed the two year
statute of limitations to run on her claim.
Lichtefeld submits that the facts presented

in this

case as they relate to the architects' and builders' statute of
repose differ substantially from the facts presented in the Allen
case and accordingly the court should not follow its ruling in
the Allen case.

In this case, Lichtefeld's claim did not even

surface until after the seven year statute of repose had lapsed.
Lichtefeld submits that if his claim were for medical malpractice
that the facts supporting the claim would show that Lichtefeld
did not become aware of any damages giving rise to a claim for
negligence against a health care provider until after the four
year statute of repose had lapsed.

Accordingly, the factual

situation presented in this case differs substantially from the
factual situation presented in Allen.
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That is not to say that the court should not follow the
reasoning as set out in the Allen case.

However, substantial

difficulties arise in applying the Allen case's analysis to this
matter.

In Allen, the

court

was

interpreting

the Medical

Malpractice Act, which contains a complete and concise statement
of the legislative intent behind the legislation.
easily

able to consider that legislative

decision

as

to

whether

the

shortening

The court was

intent and make a
of

the

statute

of

limitations from the normal statute of limitations for negligence
claims was rationally related to the intent identified by the
legislature behind the legislation.
The legislative intent behind enactment of Utah Code
Annotated

§ 78-12-25.5

legislative

purpose

is

for

not

clear.

enactment

builders' statute of repose.

of

There
the

is no stated

architects7

and

Counsel for Lichtefeld has reviewed

the materials submitted with the Horton briefs, including the
certified transcripts from the House and Senate hearings when the
architects'

and

builders'

statute

of

repose

was

enacted.

However, there does not appear to be any concise stated reason
for enactment of the legislation.

The court is left simply to

attempt to decipher the legislative intent, as courts have done
in other states when considering the architects' and contractors'
statutes of repose.
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The respondents7 argument suggests that in that there
are

more

builders7

states

which

have

held

that

the

architects7

and

statute of repose as constitutional based on equal

protection grounds than those who have found that the statute was
unconstitutional

that our statute

is somehow constitutional.

Simply stated, if this court were to follow such reasoning, the
court could never have reached the decision it reached in Berry
v. Beech Aircraft I n c , 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985).

The greater

weight of authority, even today, indicates that statutes of
repose

in state enactments concerning products liability are

constitutional.

The

court

should

dispense

summarily

with

respondents7 claim that the weight of authority should sway this
court7s decision in this matter.
It is clear that there is a split in the decisions
which have considered this issue.

The court is appraised of the

various cases and Lichtefeld submits that the court is able to
make its own determination as to which of the decisions are based
on more sound reasoning.
Even if the court adopts the respondents7 claims of
legislative

intent

behind

enactment

of

the

architects7

and

contractors7 statute of repose, those legislative ends are not
rationally

related

satisfy those ends.

to

the means

legislature

has

elected

to

Consider the stale claims argument advanced
21

by the respondents•

The court should keep in mind that it is the

plaintiff's burden to move forward on any case and the plaintiff
has the burden of proof.

No claim will ever be successful where

a plaintiff is unable to make a prima facia case.

The court's

decision in Berry, considering the facts of the Berry case is
important here.

The aircraft in Berry had been constructed

twenty-three years prior to the accident.

This court was not at

all concerned with the amount of time that had passed nor did it
even

address

this

"stale

claim"

argument

advanced

by

the

respondents.
After reading all the decisions which have come down on
both sides of the question of constitutionality of architects'
and

builders' statutes

of

repose based

on

equal

protection

grounds, the ultimate issue which the court must address is
whether

the

distinction

architects and builders
creates

a

class

or

class

creation

(and surveyors as of

separate

and

distinct

from

established

for

1988) actually
other potential

defendants.

Lichtefeld submits that the distinction is totally

artificial.

To distinguish between somebody who supplies the

material

and

the

person

who

installs

that material

improvement to real property simply is without merit.

on the

After all,

once a material is delivered to a job site, the supplier losses
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all

control

over

the

installation

of

that material

by the

contractor.
It is also apparent that the legislature has failed to
consider the life expectancy of improvements to real estate when
it enacted the seven year statute of repose.

If improvements to

real property had a life expectancy of seven years or less,
Lichtefeld admits that the seven year statute of repose would be
rationally related to the legislatures' intent.

However, the

fact is that improvements to real property have useful life
expectancies of many years.
over one hundred years.

Indeed, many structures will survive

Considering the life expectancy of the

improvements to real property, those who design and construct
such improvements should not be allowed to simply eliminate their
liability after the passage of several years.
Based on the above, it is clear that Utah's architects7
and

contractors'

statute

of

repose

does

not

represent

a

legislative enactment that is rationally related to the alleged
statutory purposes behind enactment of the statute.

The most

recent court which has considered the question, that being the
Alaska Supreme Court in Turner Construction Co., Inc. v. Scales,
which has been cited extensively in Lichtefeld's original brief,
provides a reasonable model which this court should follow.

The

Alaska

the

court

considered

all

the
23

arguments

raised

by

respondents and rejected the same. The Alaska Court's ruling was
not based on the right of contribution among tortfeasors as
alleged

in footnote 1 of the respondents' brief at page 14.

Lichtefeld concedes that the court considered the contribution
question, but the Alaska court's decision was plainly based on
the lack of a reasonable relationship between the legislative
purpose

behind

legislature

the

elected

statute
to

of

implement

repose
that

and

the

purpose.

means
The

the
court

concluded:
In our view there is no substantial
relationship between exempting design
professionals from liability, shifting
liability
for defective design
and
construction to owners and material suppliers
and the goal of encouraging construction . .
. thus, we believe that the statute means are
not substantially or rationally related to
the ends.
We conclude that [Alaska's
architects and builders' statute of repose]
violates the equal protection clause of the
Alaska Constitution.
Turner at page 472.
The means established by the Utah Legislature are not
rationally or substantially related to the legislative purpose
behind

the

architects'

and

builders'

statute

of

repose.

Accordingly, this court should find that Utah Code Annotated §
78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
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CONCLUSION
The similarities between the facts presented in this
case and the law that should be applied greatly parallel the
Berry case.

The court should reach the same conclusion that it

reached in Berry, that is that the statute of repose contained in
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25.5 is unconstitutional in that it
denies open access to the courts, a right protected by the Utah
Constitution.

Such a ruling by the court necessarily implies

that the creation of the class of protected defendants in the
architects7

and builders' repose statute is an arbitrary and

unreasonable classification, negating any rational basis between
the purposes of the legislation and the means used to attain
those ends.

Such a finding by the court should result in the

statute in question being declared unconstitutional on an equal
protection basis based on Utah and federal law.
other

independent

grounds

as

asserted

by

Each of the

Lichtefeld

in his

original brief provide additional separate grounds upon which
Judge Rokich's decision should be reversed.

Clearly, the basis

upon which Judge Rokich made his ruling, that being this court's
decision in Good v. Christensen is without merit considering this
court's ruling in Berry.

Accordingly, Lichtefeld respectfully

requests reversal of the trial court's order granting dismissal
of his claims.
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ADDENDUM

Appellant, Cal Gas Corporation ("Cal Gas"), by and through
its counsel of record, Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, submits
this Reply Brief concerning the following issues certified to this
Court by the Honorable David Sam, United States District Judge,
for the District of Utah.

Does the Utah architects' and builders' statute of repose,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953), violate Article I, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution?

IS?VE NO- ?
Does the Utah architects' and builders' statute of repose
violate Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution?
ARGUMENT

I
THE ARCHITECTS' AND BUILDERS' STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES
THE OPEN COURT PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
A.

The architects' and builders' statute of repose does not provide a person injured by reason of an architects' or builders'
negligence with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy.
As this Court concluded in its decision in Berrv v. Beech

Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (1985), the open courts provision of
the Utah Constitution allows legislative abrogation of a right of
action only if the law:
provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course
of law" for vindication of his constitutional
interest. The benefit provided by the substi- 1 -

tute must be substantially equal in value or
other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one's person, property or reputation,
although the form of the substitute remedy may
be different*
jd. at 680.
It is clear from the context of the Berrv v. Beech Aircraft decision that the alternative remedies contemplated by this
Court include remedies similar to that provided by the Worker's
Compensation Act.

See Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, supra. at 676 -

680 and footnote 3.

Under the Worker's Compensation Act, an injured

employee need not show fault in order to obtain compensation from
the employer and the employer is liable only for statutorily delineated compensation and cannot be sued civilly.

Thus, injured em-

ployees' alternative remedies are against their employers rather
than third persons.
By contrast, Buehner Concrete argues that the Legislature's abrogation of rights of action against designers, planners
and constructors of improvements to real property seven years after
the improvement is completed is proper because injured persons
have an alternative remedy in that they can sue the manufacturers
of the component parts of the improvement or the landowner.
Anyone can sue anyone.
is another matter.

Establishing liability, however,

According to Buehner Concrete, since the statuti

of repose does not categorically preclude an injured person from

- 2 -

suing, the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution is satisfied.
The mere right to sue, standing alone, can hardly be
equated with an "effective and reasonable alternative remedy by
due course of law" in accordance with the meaning attached to that
phrase by this court in the Berry v. Beech Aircraft decision.

There

is no remedy if there is no liability, and the law discourages
injured persons from suing defendants who have no liability.

See

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1981).
The standard of care imposed by Utah law upon persons
involved in the design, construction or control of improvements
to real property varies depending upon the status of those persons.
An owner of land owes an invitee the duty to conduct reasonable
inspections to find hidden dangers and of correcting those hidden
dangers.

Cannon v. Oviatt. 520 P.2d 883 (1974); Stevens v. Salt

Lake County. 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496 (1970).

By definition,

therefore, if the defect is hidden but not discoverable by a reasonable inspection, the landowner is not liable.

Stevens v. Colorado

Fuel and Iron. 24 Utah 2d 214 469 P.2d 3 (1970).
In this case, plaintiffs and Cal Gas contend that Buehner
Concrete was negligent in failing to properly connect the structural
members of the building.

These defective connections were designed

in accordance with complex engineering criteria and were covered
- 3 -

by interior walls.

Obviously, these defects were hidden and no

reasonable owner could discover them.

If these latent defects

caused plaintiffs' injuries, the owner of the Goldminer's Daughter
Lodge would not be liable under Utah law and plaintiffs will be
left without a remedy.
Buehner Concrete also suggests that an injured person
has an alternative remedy against the manufacturer of the component
parts comprising the improvement to real property.

Aside from

the fact that Senator Buckner's comments during the senate hearings
on the statute of repose bill indicate that he intended the statute
of repose to apply to the suppliers of component parts, a possible
suit against such a supplier is not an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy within the meaning of the Berrv v. Beech Aircraft
decision.
Every improvement to real property is nothing more than
component parts connected together.

Whether it be the cement used

to cast the footings, foundations or walls, the components of the
plumbing or the electrical system, or the paint on the walls, an
improvement to real property is merely an amalgamation of component
parts or products.

The manufacturers of these component parts

are liable for their negligence or for any dangerous defects in
the products.
1979).

See Hahn v. Armco Steel Company, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah

That liability runs for four years after the injury is

incurred.

Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, supra; Utah Code Ann.
4

§ 78-12-25 (1953).
Two defenses can be asserted by a component manufacturer:
(1) misuse of the product; or (2) knowledge of the defect by the
user.of the product.

Hahn v. Armco Steel, supra at 158. Thus,

if the architect or builder was negligent in installing or applying
a component, the manufacturer of that component would not be liable
for the architect's or builder's negligence and persons injured by
reason of that negligence would be left without a remedy.
It is an inescapable conclusion that Buehner Concrete's
argument that the Legislature implicitly provided injured persons
with an alternative remedy when it enacted the architects' and
builders' statute of repose because it did not eliminate all possible causes of action is without merit.

That argument ignores the

fundamental policy of the law that the person liable for the injury
should pay for the injury.

If Buehner Concrete's position were

adopted, injured persons would be left without a remedy or encouraged to bring a nonmeritorious action against an innocent landowner
or component manufacturer.

Without question, these options are not

effective and reasonable alternative remedies within the meaning
of this Court's decision in Berrv v. Beech Aircraft.
B.

The architects' and builders' statute of repose is an unreasonable and arbitrary means of eradicating illusory economic
evils.
If a reasonable and effective alternative remedy is not

provided, the Legislature may abrogate a remedy only if there is
- 5 -

a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination
of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means for achieving the objective.

Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, supra

at 680.
Other than a few stray comments by representatives or
senators during the hearings on the statute of repose bill addressing the problem of a "sue conscious" society and the possibility
that deceased or retired architects or builders might be sued,
there is nothing to indicate the economic or social evils that
the statute of repose was enacted to eliminate.

There is no evi-

dence that the Utah Legislature was presented with any facts demonstrating a social or economic evil or that the Utah legislature
was reacting to a Utah Supreme Court decision affirming an unjust
result against an architect or builder.

To fill this void, Buehner

Concrete has compiled a list of purported economic evils that might
have motivated the Utah legislature to enact the statute of repose.
These economic evils have been extracted from the comments of representatives or senators in the hearings on the statute or repose
bill or from decisions from other jurisdictions upholding the constitutionality of their statutes of repose.

Those possible economic

evils are:
1.

The broad scope of liability imposed upon builders

and architects;

- 6

2.

Suits against builders or architects based upon

the neglect, improper modification or unskilled repair of
the improvement by the owner;
3.

The 2.1% of suits that are filed against architects

or builders more than seven years after the improvement is
completed;
4.

Builders' and architects' liability that parallels

the life of the improvements;
5.

The substantial burden of proof imposed upon archi-

tects and builders in order to defend stale claims asserted
against them; and
6.

The stifling of innovation and experimentation of

architects and builders.
As will be demonstrated below, those courts and legislators, in identifying the economic evils to be eliminated by architects' and builders' statutes of repose, ignored fundamental legal
principles and, as stated by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft:
Have all but read [state constitutional open
courts or remedies provisions] out of their
respective constitutions, at least insofar as
they provide substantive, as opposed to procedural protections.
Id. at 678.
Giving the courts and legislators quoted by Buehner Concrete every benefit of the doubt, it is clear that they were operating under the following misconception:
- 7 -

Innocent architects and builders are being
sued many years after the improvement is completed and forced to prove their innocence
with stale evidence.
It is interesting to note that the courts and legislators
quoted by Buehner Concrete were oblivious to factors such as the
legitimacy or the seriousness of a plaintiff's injuries, as well
as the negligence of the architect or builder.

Rather, the exclu-

sive focus of those courts and legislators was on the burden placed
upon architects or builders by requiring them to defend.

Even

more important, however, those courts and legislators totally
ignored the following well-defined legal principles in reaching
their conclusions.
1.

Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1981) sanction plaintiffs who bring
nonmeritorious actions;
2.

The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff to

establish an architects' or builders' liability by a preponderance of the evidence;
3.

Architects and builders are only answerable for

their own negligence;
4.

Architects and builders are only obligated to perform

in accordance with the standard of care at the time the improvement was designed or constructed; and
5.

The injured person must not only prove the standard

- 8 -

of care at the time the improvement was designed or constructed, but also must prove a breach of that standard of care.
Moreover, those courts upholding the constitutionality
of a.statute of repose under an open courts provision similar to
Utah's, and the Utah legislators in enacting the statute of repose,
failed to consider the constitutional rights of persons injured
by the negligent acts of an architect or builder.

According to

this Court:
The basic purpose of Article I, Section 11 is
to impose some limitation on [the legislative
power] for the benefit of those persons who
are injured in their persons, property or reputations, since they are generally isolated in
society, belong to no identifiable group, and
rarely are able to rally the political process
to their aid.
Berrv v. Beech Aircraft, s^pra at 676.
This Court's appreciation of the trainers' intent in enacting Article I Section 11 is reminiscent of footnote 4 in the United
States v, Carolene Products Co., in which Justice Stone suggested
a stricter standard of review for laws which manifest prejudice
against discreet and insular groups as follows:
Prejudice against discreet and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
304 U.S. 144, (1938).

- 9 -

Potential tort plaintiffs cannot even identify as a group.
As a result, when pressured by special interest groups such as
products manufacturers or architects and builders, the majoritarian
political process rarely is presented with, or takes into account,
the impact of proposed legislation on potential tort plaintiffs.
By way of illustration, all of the policy reasons identified by Buehner Concrete supporting enactment of the statute of
repose militate even more strongly in favor of a hypothetical
statute holding builders and architects strictly liable for injuries
caused by an improvement after the passage of seven years from
completion of the improvement.

After all, the law imposes upon

the injured person the burden of proving not only the standard of
care, but also a breach of the standard of care.

Thus, it is the

injured person who is most seriously affected by evolving building
codes, lost architectural plans and faded memories.

In addition,

since 97.9% of all claims are brought within seven years, the
liability imposed upon the building industry by the hypothetical
statute would be minimal and easily spread throughout the industry.
It is clear that the architects7 and builders' statute
of repose is the result of a focused effort by an organized industry
to shield itself from its own negligence at the expense of isolated
persons injured by that negligence.
Thus, this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft acknowledged
the mandate of the framers of the Utah Constitution and formulated
- 10 -

a two-prong test that rationally balanced the power of the Legislature against the rights of injured persons to a remedy.

All

that is asked by persons injured by the negligence of an architect
or builder, and all that the Utah constitution requires, is that
those injured persons be allowed to attempt to prove, within the
requirements of the law, that the architect or builder was negligent
and, if successful, to recover compensation for their injuries.
The law does not allow, nor do injured persons seek, star chamber
justice whereby innocent architects or builders are forced to prove
their innocence with stale evidence.
Referring specifically to the six economic evils that
Buehner argues the statute of repose might have been enacted to
eliminate, some require more discussion than others.

However, as

discussed above, those imagined evils are insignificant when weighed
against the problems faced by an injured person who must live with
substantial uncompensated disabilities as a result of an architect's
or builder's negligence.

Each possible economic evil will be dis-

cussed separately below.
1.

Builders and architects are subject to a broad scope

of liability that requires limitation.

Buehner Concrete cites

several decisions in which architects and builders statutes of
repose have been held to be constitutional on the basis that architects and builders are subjected to a broad scope of liability
that requires limitation.
- 11 -

Specifically, Buehner Concrete quotes from an opinion
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wherein that Court stated that
since architects and builders may be liable to both landowners
and to others who use the land, while owners are only liable to
those who use the land, it is manifestly rational to enact a statute
of repose.

Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co,, 382 A.2d

715 (Pa. 1976).
Such distinctions are not difficult to draw.

The scope

of liability imposed upon all persons is limited by the concept
of foreseeability.

For example, when the concept of foreseeability

is applied to physicians, the scope of liability is limited to
the patient being treated.

Product manufacturers are subjected

to perhaps the broadest scope of liability because of the mobility
of their products.

If an airliner is defective and falls from

the sky, the manufacturer is liable to the owner, the crew, the
passengers and all persons killed or injured on the ground, whether
they be farmers in Kansas or stockbrokers in New York.

The manu-

facturer is also liable for property damage caused by the defective
airliner.
Thus, to eliminate architects' and builders' liability
for their negligence after seven years has no rational relationship
to the purported scope of liability imposed upon them.

Further,

even if the broad scope of liability constituted an economic evil,
a seven year repose period is an arbitrary and unreasonable means
- 12 -

of achieving the elimination of that evil since an injured persons
right to compensation may be lost based solely on how soon the
person is injured after the improvement is completed.
It follows that the scope of liability imposed upon architects and builders is an illusory economic evil and the statute
of repose is an unreasonable and arbitrary means of eliminating
that economic evil even if it did exist.
2.

Negligence bv the owner.

Buehner Concrete argues

that the statute of repose reasonably eliminates the evil of subjecting architects and engineers to liability for injuries caused
by the negligence, abuse, poor maintenance, mishandling, improper
modification or unskilled repair by the owner after the construction
of the improvement is complete.

In other words, if there is a

possibility that an architect or builder may have a defense based
upon the negligence of the owner, the architect or builder should
not be sued.
Clearly, making persons defend actions in which they
have defenses is hardly an economic or social evil to be eliminated.
In fact, the contrary is true.

If the mere filing of an answer

which asserted defenses was sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's
claim, the failure of the system of justice to compensate plaintiff's with legitimate contract or tort claims would constitute
an economic evil.
In addition, even if the fact that architects or builders
- 13 -

with possible defenses are forced to litigate constituted an economic evil, the use of a seven year period is unreasonable and
arbitrary.

It has absolutely nothing to do with the supposed eco-

nomic evil and discriminates among injured persons depending upon
when they are injured.
3.

Since 97.9% of all suits against architects or build-

ers are brought within seven years after the improvement is completed, it is reasonable to cut-off legitimate claims after that
point.

If only 2.1% of the claims against negligent architects

or builders are brought more than seven years after the improvement
is completed, the actual number of architects or builders that
are subject to such suits is minuscule.
In addition, once a suit is brought, it is the injured
person that must prove the standard of care at the time the improve
ment was designed or constructed and a breach of that standard of
care.

Thus, the passage of time is more detrimental to a plain-

tiff's case in chief that it is to an architect's or builder's
defense.
It is the stark contrast between the 2.1% of injured
persons with legitimate claims against a negligent architect or
builder and negligent architects or builders who must defend and
pay compensation that eviscerates this supposed policy supporting
the Legislature's enactment of the statute of repose.

- 14 -

4.

Because buildings mav last hundreds of years, repose

is needed to eliminate perpetual liability.

This purported policy

reason supporting the enactment of the statute of repose is contradictory to the policy of the law set forth by this Court in Berry
v. Beech Aircraft.

In that case, the product liability statute

of repose was struck down as arbitrary and unreasonable on the
basis, among others, that "the statute does not even purport
to approximate an average expected life of the products covered
. . . "

I£. at 681.
If improvements to real property are expected to last

100 years, it is the duty of the designer or builder of that improvement to exercise reasonable care to assure that the improvement
is safe for 100 years.

If an architect or builder is only liable

for seven years, there is less incentive to build safe buildings
resulting in an increase in the number of persons killed or injured
by shoddy design or workmanship.

Like the products liability sta-

tute of repose, the architects' and builders' statute of repose
"may well be counterproductive to public safety."
5.

id. at 683.

The statute of repose is reasonably calculated to

eliminate the substantial burden of proof imposed upon architects
and builders in order to defend stale claims asserted against them.
This point is a common thread running through all of Buehner Concrete's possible policy reasons supporting the enactment of the
statute of repose.

As such, it has been discussed above and Cal
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Gas will simply reiterate that the injured plaintiff must prove
the standard of care, its breach and causation before a negligent
architect or builder is liable.

Faded memories, evolving stan-

dards of care or lost documents increase the plaintiff's burden
much more than they decrease a negligent architect's or builder's
ability to defend.
6.

The statute of repose encourages innovation and

experimentation of architects and builders.

Finally, Buehner Con-

crete argues that without a statute of repose innovation and experimentation by architects and builders would be stifled.
this statement is correct.

Fortunately,

If innovation and experimentation in

the design or construction of improvements meets accepted industry
practices, the architect or builder will not be liable.

On the

other hand, if the innovation and experimentation does not meet
accepted industry practices, it should be discouraged.
Statutes of repose, such as the architects' and builders'
statute of repose, should not be enacted to encourage professionals
or products manufacturers to exceed the bounds of accepted standards
of care or industry practices.

If an experiment or innovation, not

in accord with the standard of care, fails and injures an innocent
person who had no say in the innovative or experimental design or
construction, the architect or builder should be liable and should
not be shielded from the liability by a statute of repose.
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In addition, the Uniform Building Code which governs
the design and construction of improvements to real property is
updated, revised and supplemented each year.

As the Preface to

that .Code states:
The Uniform Building Code is dedicated to the
development of better building construction
and greater safety to the public by uniformity
in building laws. The code is founded on broadbased performance principles that make possible
the use of new materials and new construction
systems.
•

• • •

Changes to the code are processed each year
and published in supplements in a form permitting ready adoption by local communities.
These changes are carefully reviewed in public
hearings by professional experts in the field
of building construction and fire and life
safety.
Uniform Building Code. Preface (1985 ed.)

(Attached as Appendix

"A") .
Since design and construction innovation, after being
tested and approved by the building industry, are incorporated into
the Uniform Building Code on a yearly basis, an architect or builder
can apply those innovations in accordance with industry standards
and, if those innovations cause injury, the architect or builder
would not be liable.
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